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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to impose a constructive trust 
upon certain property purchased from the Appellants by the 
third-party defendants. Appellants claim that the third-party 
defendants agreed to hold four (4) building lots sold to them 
in trust for the Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury on the 23rd and 
24th day of September, 1975, before the Honorable J. Robert 
-1-
Bullock. The tiral court found in favor of the Defendants 
Carter and against the Plaintiffs, no cause of action. The 
Plaintiff objected to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law of the trial court and made a motion to make additional 
findings and a motion for a new trial. On November 20, 1975, 
the trial court denied Plaintiffs' objection and motions. The 
Plaintiffs appeal the decision of the trial court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to have the Court affirm the rulings 
of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents disagree with Appellants1 Statement of 
Facts in the following particulars: 
In January of 1966 Plaintiffs Nielsons brought 
suit against the Rasmussens. (R. 4-8) In March or April of 
1966 the Defendant Bert Carter started negotiating with the 
Plaintiffs for the purchase of a part of their property 
comprised of approximately 15 acres. (Tr. 181, lines 3-9) 
During the course of negotiations with the Plaintiffs, Defendant 
Bert Carter had occasion to be near the property in April of 
1966 with Wesley Rasmussen and discussed with him Rasmussen's 
desire to acquire four (4) lots from the 15 acre plot. (Tr. 
181, lines 15-21) On May 18, 1966, the Defendants Carters 
purchased approximately 15 acres of ground from the Plaintiffs 
as shown by Exhibits 1 and 2. The purchase price for said 
property was $19,100. (Tr. 38, lines 21-30) Appellants1 State-
ment of Facts states that problems arose as to the description 
of the property being transferred. This statement of fact is 
not supported by the evidence. The documents Exhibit 1 and 2 
show the full legal description of the property transferred to 
the Defendants Carter by the Plaintiffs on May 18, 1966, both 
contained in the purchase contract and in the Deed of Transfer. 
The preliminary discussion with Rasmussens concerning the four 
(4) lots was not included in the first contract of purchase. 
(Exs. 1 & 2) 
Appellants state that Defendants Carter induced the 
Plaintiffs Nielson to transfer all of the property on the 
promise that they would later transfer four (4) lots to the 
Rasmussens. This was not the finding of the trial court nor the 
facts. (R. 160; Tr. 122, lines 1216; Tr. 134, lines 3-12, 
23-28) The true facts are that Defendants Carter purchased 
15 acres of ground from the Plaintiffs Nielson, with the 
Plaintiffs Nielson retaining other parts of their property. 
(Ex. 7) Defendant Bert Carter admits discussing the transfer of 
lots with Raimussen as stated in Appellants' Statement of Facts, 
but this was prior to Defendants Carter's purchase of the property 
from the Plaintiffs. Rasnussen only met with Plaintiffs Carter 
on the property once and that was before the purchase from 
Plaintiffs. (Tr. 150, lines 8-9; Tr. 118, lines 10-14: Tr. 181, 
lines 15-30; Tr. 150, lines 4-15) Defendant Bert Carter knew 
that Rasmussens were in a dispute over lots with the Plaintiffs 
Nielson. (Tr. 181, lines 22-30; Tr. 182, lines 1-21) After 
the purchase of the 15 acres by the Defendant Bert Carter in 
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May, 1966, Rasmussens and Plaintiffs Nielson entered into a 
settlement agreement on April 12, 196 7. (Ex. 3) Defendants 
Carter were not present at the signing of the settlement agree-
ment and did not have any knowledge of the negotiations or the 
settlement agreement as testified to by the Plaintiff Archie 
Nielson. (Tr. 75, lines 22-24; Tr. 76, lines 5, 16-26) In 
January of 1974 Rasmussens answered the complaint of Plaintiffs 
Nielson which had been filed in 1966 and also counterclaimed 
against Plaintiffs Nielson. Rasmussens further filed a third-
party complaint against Defendants Carter, which was dismissed 
upon motion by the trial court. (R. 24, 25 & 37) On February 
7, 1974, Plaintiffs answered Rasmussens1 counterclaim and filed 
a complaint against Defendants Carter nearly eight years after 
the contract for purchase and deed to Defendants Carter had 
been executed and after Carter had taken possession of the 
property and completed payment for the property. 
Appellants' Statement of Facts sets forth allegations 
that Defendants Carter participated in the settlement agreement 
between Defendants Carter and Rasmussens. This is contrary to the 
facts found by the trial court and presented wherein Plaintiff 
Archie Nielson admitted that Defendants Carter did not participate 
or have knowledge of the settlement between Plaintiffs Nielson 
and Rasmussens. (Tr. 75-76). 
At the time of the execution of the purchase agreement 
by the Defendants from the Plaintiffs, the written agreement 
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comprised the entire agreement between the parties as testified 
to by Plaintiffs Nielson as shown in the transcript (Tr. 29-30) 
wherein the question was asked of Plaintiff Archie Nielson: 
Q: Now was there any other agreement you had 
with Mr. Carter at the time of the signing 
of that agreement other than that he would 
let Mr. Lewis see a copy of the agreement? 
As No 
At the time of the signing of the purchase agreement the attorney 
for Defendants, Mr. Hugh Vern Wentz, read the agreement to the 
Plaintiffs and their daughter who was present/ in the presence 
of Defendant Bert Carter. (Tr. 165) At that time no questions 
were asked by the Plaintiffs1 daughter with regard to the alleged 
four (4) lots to be transferred to Rasmussens. This was an 
arm's length transaction between parties who had had no prior 
dealings. Plaintiffs so testified. (Tr. 26, lines 17-20; Tr. 
52, lines 22-26) After the payments had been completed by the 
Defendants Carter on May 5, 1972, the Plaintiffs entered in 
their own handwriting "paid in full" on the purchase agreement 
by which Defendants were making purchase of the property. (Tr. 
38, lines 21-30) Again at that time no question was raised by 
the Plaintiffs regarding the alleged four (4) lots in any manner 
whatsoever. (Testimony of Sylvia Nielson, Tr. 96, lines 27-30; 
Tr. 97, lines 1-3) 
At the commencement of the lawsuit the Plaintiffs 
filed a Lis Pendens covering all property of Defendants Carter 
although they allegedly claimed only four (4) lots. By stipulation 
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the parties released all but four (4) lots so as not to impose 
a Lis Pendens beyond that which could have been affected by 
any decision of the Court, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED BOTH ON THE LAW AND 
UPON THE FACTS THAT THE COVEYANCE OF LAND TO DEFENDANTS, 
CARTER, BY THE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT IMPOSE A CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUST,. 
The law of this State requires that the creation of a 
trust over real property must be based upon a written instrument 
subscribed by the party creating the trust. 25-5-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended: 
No estate or interest in real property, other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one year, 
nor any trust or power over or concerning real 
property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered 
or declared otherwise than by act or operation 
of law or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting^ 
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, 
or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized 
by writing. [emphasis supplied] 
An exception to such requirement exists where the law imposes 
as an equitable remedy, a constructive trust. 
To overturn the written instrument and establish the 
constructive trust the burden of persuasion is upon the party 
claiming the existence of the trust to establish such by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
As stated by this Court in Jewell v. Horner, (1961) 
12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d 594, at page 333: 
. . . the authorities are practically uniform to 
the point that to justify a court in determining 
from oral testimony that a deed which purports 
to convey land absolutely in fee simple was 
intended to be something different/ such as a 
trust, such testimony must be clear and 
convincing, [emphasis supplied] 
The Court went on to cite with approval Chambers v. 
Emery/ (1896) 13 Utah 374/ 45 P., 192f and the Court's statement 
therein at page 392: 
In such event the proof must be strong/ clear 
and convincing/ such as to leave no doubt of 
the existence of the trust. Such a case is 
similar to one where it is attempted to convert 
a deed absolute into a mortgage/ or where the 
reformation of a written instrument is sought 
on the ground of accident/ mistake, or fraud. 
In all such cases the court will scrutinize 
parol evidence with great caution/ and the 
plaintiff must fail unless it is clear/ definite/ 
unequivocal/ and conclusive, [emphasis supplied] 
In Paulsen, et al, v. Coombs/ et ux,# (1953)/ 123 Utah 
49/ 253 P.2d 621/ at page 56 this Court said: 
The question of whether evidence is sufficient 
to be clear and convincing is primarily for 
the trial court; his finding should not be 
disturbed unless we must say as a matter of 
law that no one could reasonably find the 
evidence to be clear and convincing. 
The Restatement of the Law of Trusts in Section 4 5 
reads: 
Where the owner of an interest in land transfers 
Ttf inter vivos to another in trust for a thXrcT 
person, but no memorandum properly evidencing the 
intention to create a trust is signed/ as required 
by the Statutes of Frauds, and the transferee refuses 
to perform the trust/ the transferee holds the 
interest upon a constructive trust for the third 
person/ iff but only if/ 
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(a) the tranferee by fraud, duress or undue 
influence prevented the transferor from creating 
an enforceable interest in the third person, or 
(b) the transferee at the time of the transfer 
was in a confidential relation to the transferor, or 
(c) the transfer was made by the transferor in 
anticipation of death. [emphasis supplied] 
This Court has cited with approval as the law in this 
State the above section of the Law of Trusts in the determination 
of the criteria for establishment of a constructive trust. 
Haws v. Jensen, (1949) 116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229. Thus, in only 
three circumstances will the Court impose constructive trusts 
as an equitable remedy: (a) where the transferee obtained the 
property by fraud, duress or undue influence; (b) where the 
transferee was at the time of transferring in a confidential 
relation with the transferor; and (c) where the transfer was 
made in anticipation of death. The evidence in the case now 
before the Court clearly eliminates the claim of a transfer 
obtained by fraud, duress or undue influence or a transfer made 
in the anticipation of death. The only criteria remaining now 
on which Appellants rely is that the transferor and transferee 
were in a confidential relationship. This matter will be dealt 
with more completely in Point II of this Brief. 
In Peterson v. Peterson, (1943) 105 Utah 133, 141 
P.2d 882, the transferee was the brother and as stated by the 
Court at page 135: 
The plaintiffs because of the fact that Charles 
—
 ~ was their brother and because of their long deal-
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ings with him in the partnership relied upon said 
representations and signed quit claim deeds to 
Charles. [emphasis supplied] 
Under such circusmtances the Court held the imposition 
of the trust to contravene the deed, absolute on its face. 
In Haws v. Jensen, supra., the transfer was between a 
mother and daughter and the Court said at page 216: 
Admittedly there is no writing evidencing 
Mrs. Haws1 intention that the property 
conveyed by her be held in trust by Amber. 
In the case now before the Court, the usual circumstance 
for establishing a constructive trust are not present; that is, a 
transfer by deed without any further agreement evidencing the 
intention of the transferor. In this case there was not only 
the deed transferring the property to the Defendants (Ex. 2), 
but a contractual agreement spelling out the terms and conditions 
of the transfer drawn by an attorney and executed by the parties 
in the presence of their daughter and the attorney. (Ex. 1) 
The need for the essential element of the confidential relation-
ship is further shown in Haws v. Jensen, supra., when the 
Court said at page 217: 
Thus this allegation along with the fact that 
the grantor and grantee were mother and 
daughter, which appears on the face of the 
complaint, is a sufficient allegation of 
a confidential relation. Scott on Trusts, 
Vol. I, Sec. 44.2 states: 
fA constructive trust is imposed even 
if there is no fiduciary relationship 
such as that between attorney and client, 
principal and agent, trustee and bene-
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ficiary; it is sufficient that there is 
a family relationship or other personal 
relationship of such a character that the 
transferor is justified in believing that 
the transferee will act in his interest, 
[emphasis supplied] 
In 1953# this Court found facts sufficient to impose a constructive 
trust in Hawkins v. Perry/ et al., (1953), 123 Utah 16/ 254 
P.2d 372/ when at page 24 it said: 
At the time Hawkins gave Perry the money the 
former was a boy of 16; he was acting under 
the advice of Mr. Perry, who was an older man, 
his relative, and a minister of the gospel. 
These circumstances satisfy the requirement that 
a confidential relationship exist as a founda-
tion for the imposition of a constructive trust 
as decreed by the trial court. [emphasis supplied] 
In Jewell v. Horner, (1961)/ supra., this Court over-
turned a trial court finding of a constructive trust holding 
that the evidence did not establish such trust by clear and 
convincing evidence and distinguished Haws v. Jensen, supra., 
at page 334 by pointing out that in Haws there was no consideration 
for the transfer and in Jewell there was a consideration paid for 
the transfer. In the case now at bar. Defendants Carter paid 
$19/100 for the conveyance of the property pursuant to the terms 
of the contract. (Ex. 1) Surrounding jurisdictions have held 
to the same rulings as the Utah decisions. The Oklahoma case 
of Peyton v. McCaslin, (1966)/ 417 P.2d 316f and the Colorado 
case of Austin v. Wysowatcky/ (1973)/ 511 P.2d 526. 
In each of the Utah cases which have ruled that a 
constructive trust existed, there has been a family# or other 
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fiduciary relationship between the transferor and the transferee: 
Peterson v. Peterson, supra., - transfer by family 
members to their brother; 
Haws v. Jensen, supra., - transfer by mother to 
daughter; 
Hawkins v. Perry, supra., - tranfer by youth to 
advisor, his relative and minister; and in 
Jewell v. Horner, supra., - transfer by father to 
daughter, but trust was denied because consideration 
was paid. 
In the case now before the Court the Defendant Blanch 
G. Carter never had any dealings with the Plaintiffs prior to 
this litigation. The Defendant Bert Carter was a purchaser of 
property having no prior transactions or business relationship 
or personal relationship with the Plaintiffs. (Tr. 26, 
lines 17-20; Tr. 52, lines 22-26) The transaction was formulated 
in a written agreement (Ex. 1), coupled with a deed, (Ex. 2) and 
a consideration was paid in the amount of $19,100.00 for the 
purchase of the property. 
The trial court never lost sight of the fact that in 
this case an agreement was entered into between Plaintiffs 
and Defendants on the 18th day of May, 1966. (Ex. I) That 
by that agreement Defendants agreed to make payments of 
$19,100 in annual installments of $3,000 to the Plaintiffs 
for the purchase of the property. That the agreement provided 
for forfeiture of payments made in the event that the Defendants 
did not complete their payments. Defendants agreed further 
to pay all taxes and assessments upon the property after the 
date of the execution of the agreement and to keep all 
insurable buildings and improvements on the premises insured in 
a company acceptable to the Plaintiffs in an amount not less 
than the value of the buildings. The agreement further 
provided that the Defendants of the property upon failure to pay 
taxes, assessments or insurance premiums would be subject to 
three-quarters of one percent per month interest on said sums 
advanced by the Plaintiffs until repaid by the Defendants. 
A further paragraph of significance in the transaction 
is the paragraph on the third page of the agreement (Ex. 1) 
which reads as follows: 
It is hereby expressly understood and agreed 
by the parties hereto that the Buyers accept 
said property in its present condition, and 
will require marketable title only to the 
title description, but will acquire title to 
all the land lying within the fence line it 
being understood that the Buyers shall have 
the right to perfect title in themselves 
to all lands lying within the fence line. 
These provisions in the agreement show the rights of the Defendants 
to the property as their own and refutes any claim of trust by 
such provision. To construe under such provision of the agree-
ment that the Defendants were holding the property in trust for 
other persons is inconceivable. A further provision was included 
in the agreement between the Defendants and Plaintiffs that in 
the event of default by the Defendants (buyers) they subjected 
themselves of the payment of attorney's fees from enforcing the 
agreement. This, too, refutes any claim of trust and verifies 
the buyer-seller relationship. This was an arm's-length buyer-
seller transaction clearly evidenced by the agreement and the 
deed that transferred 1:I.:L , H \.<H- i i^ v - • -:\n ;>. . • 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THERE WAS NOT A 
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFFS AND 
THE DEFENDANTS UPON WHICH A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST COULD 
BE PREDICATED. 
As stated in Appellants1 brief, the trial court 
properly recognized that one of the preconditions for the imposi-
tion of a constructive trust is the existence of a confidential 
relationship between the parties which caused the grantor to 
rely on the assurances of the grantee. Although in this case 
the trial court held that there was no representation or 
agreement by the Defendants that they would hold the alleged 
four (4) lots in trust, Plaintiffs' ostensible quotation from 
the Haws case contained on page 12 of Appellants' brief is an 
amalgamation of several quotes from the case taken out of 
context without the intervening explanation. At page 217 of 
the Haws case, supra., speaking through Justice Wolfe the court 
quoted from Scott on Trusts, Vol I, Sec. 44.2 that a fiduciary 
relationship is not necessary to establish a confidential relation-
ship, that: 
. . .it is sufficient that there is a family 
relationship or other personal relationship 
of such a character that the thransferor is 
justified in believing that the transferee 
will act in his interest. [emphasis supplied] 
In the case now before the Court the Defendants were 
negotiating for purchasing land from the Plaintiffs. This 
was the first business dealings and first transactions between 
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This brings us to the app^ .. j.ia:~.-„f :; ciain t'-iat. 
the evidence discloses without, contradiction 
that "a relationship of trus: and confidence 
existed between Mrs. Luce and I Irs. Ampuero1. 
No evidence whatever is pointed out to show 
that such relati on beyond the fact that they 
had been close friends since girlhood, had 
corresponded, visited back and forth., and 
Mrs. Ampuero considered the respondent the 
most reliable friend she had. It is conceded 
by respondent's counsel that Mrs. Ampuero had 
confidence in Mrs. Luce. But that is not 
to say that a confidential or fiduciary 
relation, as those terms are used in the 
authorities . . [authorities cited] . . 
existed between them. 
The Court there quoted from Brison v. Brison, 7 5 Ca 52 5, 
J . .. . . 1 : 
It is not every case where parties trust 
each other that the law recognizes as 
confidential . Zunpuero y. Luce, et^  a 1 ., 
supra . , at \)'- 4 
I ;
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The cases are clear that where there is 
some sort of a status between the grantor 
and grantee, and confidence is imposed, a 
constructive trust will be imposed upon 
repudiation of the oral promise to reconvey. 
Thus actual trust and confidence, plus the 
relationship of parent and child, is sufficient. 
and went on to cite many cases where the relationship was 
essential to the imposition of the constructive trust. 
In Peterson, supra., this Court further announced 
when it cited from Scott on Trusts that there are numerous 
cases to the effect that where at the time of the transfer the 
transferee was in a confidential relationship to transferor and 
the transferor relied on an oral promise to reconvey the land 
the transferee is chargeable as constructive trustee of the land 
for the transferor. The trial court in this case did not 
find that the transferee, Defendants Carter, made any such 
oral promise to reconvey the land, and even if it had made such 
finding, there is no showing that there was the confidential 
relationship between the parties as contemplated by the Court in 
the Peterson case. The provision in the purchase agreement (Ex. 
1) asserted by plaintiffs as the basis for establishing the 
confidential relationship is more than offset by the further 
provisions in the agreement requiring the (a) payment of 
consideration; (b) subjecting them to liability of attorney's 
fees in the event of default; (c) payment of taxes and insurance 
premiums; and (d) the other provisions of the purchase agreement 
imposing obligations upon the Defendants together with the fact 
t i iat the agreement rakes as r e fe rence io the . . . *wjeu L: 
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Plaintiffs allege that the statements in the legal 
documents, the lack of specificity, prior dealings of the parties 
and agents and acts of Plaintiffs Archie and Sylvia Nielson all 
clearly show that the relationship was one of trust and confidence. 
The transcript shows quite the contrary. Plaintiffs Archie and 
Sylvia Nielson secured separate legal counsel to evaluate the 
transaction, (Tr. 28, lines 28-30; Tr. 29, line 1) There were 
no prior dealings between the parties. The trial court's 
conclusion that there was not a confidential relationship existing 
between the Plaintiffs and Defendants is the only conclusion 
the Court could make based upon the evidence presented to the 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court as the trier of the fact in this case 
correctly concluded that Defendants did not enter into any oral 
agreement to hold four (4) lots in trust for the Plaintiffs or 
for the Rasmussens. It correctly found that there was no 
confidential relationship between the parties and no constructive 
trust to be imposed by the Court. The decision was fully in 
line with all of the Utah decisions regarding constructive 
trusts and the facts present in this case. 
Respectfully submitted. 
M. Dayle Jpffs 
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